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Abstract
We assess the changing nature of the relationships between financial in-
stitutions and sovereigns globally using a weighted, directed network of
CDS spreads. The framework includes both the strength and direction
of the links in the network, allowing us to formally test for evidence on
changes in the completeness of the network, for contagion effects, and for
strengthening and weakening of the links in the network. We find evi-
dence of all of these effects for 107 US dollar denominated CDS spreads
over 2003-2014. We use the results to illustrate the change from a rela-
tively robust network with some vulnerability to financial sector shocks
in the pre-GFC period to a highly fragile network during the GFC and
a subsequent return to greater robustness post-GFC where, despite the
Greek and European debt crisis effects, fragility is similar when sourced
from either financial sector or sovereign debt shocks.
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1 Introduction
International connections between financial instiutions and sovereign debt mar-
kets are important for financial and economic stability. Following the banking
and sovereign crises in Europe over 2008-2012 considerable attention has been
applied to avoiding future crisis conditions in these markets by better regula-
tion and oversight of financial institutions and a thorough understanding of the
role of sovereign debt, including for example calls for non-zero risk weightings
on sovereign debt in bank capital assessment; see Hannoun (2011) and Korte
and Steffen (2017). Discussion over the root cause of the crisis led to discourse
on the diabolic loop (Brunnermeier et al, 2016) where crises spread between
the public and private debt sectors of economies as mutually reinforcing prob-
lems and the potential of bidirectional links (Acharya et al, 2014a). Podstawaski
and Velinov (2018) provide an overview of the taxonomy of the proposed linkage
mechanisms between the two sectors. The empirical evidence for the influence of
crisis conditions passing within and between the two sectors is growing rapidly,
including for cross-border transmissions (Kalbaska and Gatowski, 2012; Alter
and Schuler, 2012; Ureche-Rangau and Burietz, 2013; de Bruyckere et al., 2013;
Black et al., 2016; Betza et al., 2016; Buch et al., 2016, Kallestrup et al. 2016).
The less well-established aspects of these transmissions are their relative impor-
tance in different market conditions, whether it is possible to detect building
vulnerability to shocks from either source market, and how they contribute to
the fragility of an existing financial network.
This paper develops an empirical framework for analyzing the network of
connections between financial institutions and sovereign debt, focusing on evi-
dence of changes in the network structure during periods of market stress. The
framework provides a mechanism by which ‘robust-but-fragile’ networks may
emerge in the face of an unexpected shock to the system through the financial
sector (which we label poor investment decisions) and/or from the sovereign
sector (which we label as poor government policies). It differs from the existing
literature in examining the changing nature of the networks of interconnections
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over different phases, thus controlling for different volatility regimes (an advance
on de Bruyckere et al., 2013) and includes a weighted directed network, improv-
ing on the unweighted approach of Billio et al. (2012) and the weighted approach
of Diebold and Yilmaz (2014, 2016) which includes insignificant linkages.
We provide evidence on three specific hypotheses regarding the changing
nature of a global network comprising 67 financial sector institutions and 40
sovereigns via the CDS market over the period 2003 - 2013. Specifically, our
framework provides evidence for (i) changes in network completeness weighted
by the strength of linkages, combining information on the existence of linkages
and their relative importance; (ii) changes in the number of connections between
nodes and their strength, consistent with existing tests of contagion; and (iii)
the structure of the network and how it evolves under different scenarios. We
test for potential changes in the network from September 15, 2008, consistent
with the global financial crisis initiated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
and from April 1, 2010, consistent with the period of the Greek and subsequent
sovereign debt crises in Europe.
Our evidence supports a high degree of network completeness, consistent
with the major role played by common factors in Longstaff et al. (2011). The
empirical framework is based on a network of edges assessed by Granger causal-
ity tests as in Billio et al. (2012) and Merton et al. (2013). Drawing on Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009, 2014, 2016) and weighting the existence of linkages by their
strength, we show that financial network completeness falls, consistent with
Atil et al. (2016) and Fabozzi et al. (2016). The number of links and the com-
pleteness of the network incorporating financial institutions and sovereigns may
increase across certain crises, as in Billio et al. (2012), Billio et al. (2016), or
fall, as in Caporin et al. (2018). Net declines in network completeness may, for
example, represent the removal of a large number of weaker linkages and their
replacement with a small number of stronger linkages, resulting in differences in
network topology between periods. This is important because policymakers may
wish to react quite differently to a larger, more loosely connected network than
to a more concentrated strongly connected one; see, for example, the literature
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on bank concentration during crises, Beck et al. (2006).
Our approach nests tests for contagion in a systemic risk assessment through
the removal and formation of new linkages during periods of financial stress.
Contagion is defined as the formation of new linkages, such as new commonali-
ties between formerly unrelated assets, (Dungey and Renault, 2018; Bekaert et
al., 2014; Dungey and Martin, 2007), or the breakdown of linkages between
counterparties (Gai and Kapadia, 2010) and differences in the transmission
mechanisms for tail-shocks,(Boyson et al., 2010; Busetti and Harvey, 2011).
By using the Granger causality framework, we are methodologically associated
with the contagion literature (Longstaff, 2010; Marais and Bates, 2006; Sander
and Kleimeier, 2003).1
Evidence of changes in the network structure around the timing of the global
financial crisis supports shifts in relationships between financial institutions and
sovereign debt markets. One form of these shifts is consistent with both a global
flight from markets with heavily increased risk during the crisis - notably source
markets from European sovereigns and US financial institutions - represented
by the breakdown of network linkages. The other form represents seeking new
markets, consistent with a shift in relative risk/return trade-offs globally - no-
tably increased linkages with Africa - represented by the formation of new links
in the network.
To examine the issue of the resilience of the network to shocks, and a guage of
whether it is robust or fragile, we calculate the expected number of defaults for
the network in different sample phases in response to shocks from the banking
and/or the sovereign debt sectors. To capture these channels we explore four
different scenarios. The first is the benchmark Good times when the network
does not encounter any shocks from either source. When both sovereign and
financial sectors experience stress simultaneously then economic outcomes are
1Acemoglu et al. (2015) use the term contagion to denote the transmission of shocks
across their networks based on the known lending relationships between banks. Their usage
is more consistent with spillovers, where spillovers are ex ante known linkages between nodes;
contagion is usually used to refer to transmission of shocks beyond that indicated by the usual
linkages. For an overview, see Dungey et al. (2005).
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expected to be worse, and we dub this as the stress scenario. Sovereign debt
stress can be a source of defaults for not only other sovereigns but also the
financial sector. We examine this through a Poor government channel for shocks
from sovereigns to the rest of the network. Similarly, Poor investment decisions
resulting in shocks from the financial sector may transmit stress to the sovereign
sector.
We examine the robustness and fragility of the network when exposed to the
four combinations of shocks and during different phases of network evolution.
In particular, we look at what the implication is for the number of defaults in
response to a poor outcome in one or both markets when the network represents
relatively calm decisions, when it is already under stress, and when it is in a
recovery phase. We find that the network is indeed more fragile when confronted
by shocks from both sectors. However, the nature of this fragility changes with
the different phases. In the calm, pre-crisis period, the benchmark expected
number of defaults is relatively low, but a 3 standard deviation shock in both
sovereign and banking sectors increases this to almost one quarter of the nodes,
and is dominated by the response to banking sector shocks, sovereign debt
shocks play a minor role in the fragility of the network. In the GFC period the
stress scenario results in the default of almost all nodes in the network when the
shock is sufficiently high. Both the banking and sovereigns are important sources
pointing towards the existence of a diabolic loop. In the post-GFC period the
network settles again where the expected number of defaults absent shocks is
similar to that of the pre-crisis period. However, a major difference is evident
in the fragility of the network via financial institutions. In the third phase the
financial institutions contribute to fragility at a rate which has reduced to be
marginally less than that of the sovereign debt sector. The evidence clearly
supports that the fragility in the pre-crisis financial network was firmly located
in the banking sector.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation and related
empirical hypotheses for analyzing empirically a network incorporating financial
institutions (banks), real economy firms, and sovereign debt. Section 3 explores
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the data set used for empirical analysis. The econometric methodology for
establishing edges is outlined in Section 4, and Section 5 presents results for
our sample of 107 entities (financial institutions and sovereigns), and Section 6
provides the analysis of network robustness and fragility in response to shocks
sourced in either sector. Section 7 concludes.
2 Motivation and hypotheses development
Theoretical network models for the transmission of shocks between banks can
be found in Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2015). In these
frameworks banks are in the business of lending for projects with uncertain re-
turns and, as in Diamond (1982) banks cannot fund their lending activities from
their own balance sheets and need to engage in inter-bank relationships. This
creates networks of liabilities between banks, where the edges are determined by
repayments required between pairs of financial institutions. Banking networks
become highly interconnected as banks can hold assets and liabilities with any
number of other banks in the network, as in Allen and Babus (2009).
The empirical evidence supports that banks may also experience crises in-
duced by sovereign debt market conditions, and that sovereign debt market con-
ditions may reflect crises originating in financial institutions; see for example
Acharya et al. (2014a). The existing literature hypothesises that the trans-
mission of crisis conditions between financial institutions and sovereign debt
may occur via a number of possible channels. A number of alternative naming
conventions exist for the channels of transmission between sovereign debt and
financial markets, or sometimes equivalently between private and public credit
provision, Podstawski and Velinov (2018) provide a recent review. Brunner-
meier et al. (2016) coined the term diabolic loop to capture the case when these
channels become mutually reinforcing.
The basis of much of the transmission of stress between financial institu-
tions and the sovereign debt sector stems from the relatively large holdings of
sovereign debt by financial institutions, and the (implicit or explicit) guarantees
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governments offer financial institutions to ensure financial stability. Financial
institutions will be negatively effected by any decline in the value of the sovereign
debt assets, triggering balance sheet effects and encouraging them to deleverage
their private credit provision. This channel is referred to as the collateral chan-
nel (Podstawski and Velinov, 2018) or portfolio channel (Buch et al., 2016). A
reduction in sovereign debt ratings can bring about a similar effect (Arezki et
al, 2011). In addition to these balance sheet effects, stress in the sovereign debt
sector may also lead to concerns about the ability of the government sector to
withstand and fund calls for support from the financial sector, effectively de-
creasing the insurance value they provide via the guarantee channel (Alter and
Schuler, 2012, Kallestrup et al., 2016).
Government influence on the behaviour of financial institutions also forms a
possible channel for transmission of crises from sovereigns. When a government
either has substantial ownership (perhaps through nationalisation) or influence
over financial institutions it may use moral suasion to encourage financial insti-
tutions to invest strategically in the sovereign debt of the stressed nation. In
this way the financial sector becomes more exposed to the stricken public debt
sector, providing a potential means of a worsening spiral. This channel may
contribute to increased evidence of home bias, where the financial institution
becomes more exposed to the domestic problems and/or to risk shifting between
the sectors. Acharya and Steffen (2015) combine moral suasion, home bias and
risk shifting under the heading of a carry-trade channel, where it essentially
captures the case of taking on more risk in hope of increased payoff to improve
the longer term situation. Both Altavia, Pagano, Manganelli (2017) and Onega,
Popov and van Horen (2016) distinguishing carry trade (as risk shifting) from
moral suasion and provide empirical evidence supporting its existence. Altavia
et al. (2017) find that banks which are public or have been recently rescued are
more likely to be subject to moral suasion.
A further channel from sovereigns to the financial sector exists via macroe-
conomic policy decisions. Unsustainable macroeconomic policy actions will be
reflected in the risk of sovereign debt which results in risk transfer to the finan-
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cial sector. Jorda et al. (2016) finds little historical evidence that developed
markets have crises that are preceded by bad fiscal policy as the precipitating
condition (they exclude emerging markets), but does confirm that poor public
debt situations prior to crisis events result in longer and deeper recessions than
otherwise. They argue that the evidence strongly supports private credit mar-
kets as the source of crisis events. See also the historical overview of Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009).
The sovereign debt sector may also receive stress from stressed financial in-
stitutions who seek a greater proportion of safe assets via the collateral channel.
The safety net channel describes the implicit guarantees provided by sovereigns
to financial institutions. When financial institutions are under stress this cre-
ates a link to the sovereign bond markets via the option on government support
which is priced into the equity value, and hence balance sheet, of the financial
institutions. Financial institutions will buy government debt in order to meet
their prudential targets (Brunnermeier et al., 2016). Concerns about the need
to fund bailouts will pressure the debt sustainability of the public sector. As
balance sheets of the private lending sector contract this will lead to contraction
of credit in the economy and cetirus paribus, reduced economic activity and less
government revenue to meet ongoing fiscal obligations (Kallestrup et al., 2016,
Alter and Schuler, 2012).
When a diabolic loop is established, and financial sector crises and sovereign
debt crises coincide, the outcomes for economies are disproportionately worse
than when faced with only one source of crisis. Altavia, Pagano, Manganelli
(2017) find that stressed banks which face sovereign debt stress have significantly
larger cuts in lending. It is well known that dual crisis recessions are more severe
than those where only one market is affected. Most existing analyses do not
specifically investigate the role of transmission across national borders between
banking and sovereign debt markets, see Arezki et al. (2011) for an exception.
However, this is a source of further concern, prompting the formation of more
forums for cross-national regulatory co-operation, and proposals for Sovereign
Bond-Backed Securities, such as European Safe Bonds (ESBies), to distribute
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the flight of funds during crises more evenly across national borders, as discussed
in Brunnermeier et al. (2016) and Brunnermeier et al. (2017).
Our empirical framework links these channels of transmission with network
theory via the funds that banks choose not to invest in private sector oppor-
tunities. In models such as Acemoglu et al. (2015) these uninvested funds are
considered equivalent to a sovereign bond bearing a certain return with no risk.
These networks model risks to banks via the uncertain outcomes of their private
sector investment decisions. However, as outlined risks may also occur via the
sovereign bond market, see also Buch et al. (2016). In this case the values of
returns on investment projects and/or sovereign bonds are influenced by an ex-
ternal negative shock as in Glasserman and Young (2015). This shock impacts
the network and an entity defaults if it is not able to meet its obligations. In this
case, the magnitude of a shock impacts the default probability of an entity and
its obligations, potentially increasing the default probability of other entities.
The default probability also depends on the volatility of shock that nonlinearly
affects the network.
The default risk captured by the balance sheet variables of financial insti-
tutions is reflected in CDS spreads (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2012). We use
variance decompositions to capture the impacts of shocks on the CDS spreads,
relating our methodological framework to the approach of Diebold and Yilmaz
(2014). The existence of links between entities is established from Granger
causality tests as in Billio et al. (2012). The completeness of the network is
characterized by both the number of links between entities and by the corre-
sponding weights. Hypothesis 1 distinguishes whether networks are in fact more
intertwined during periods of stress due to the number of linkages or its strength.
Moreover, in order to better understand the nature of the crisis we differentiate
between weak and strong links (Hypothesis 2).
Hypothesis 1 The completeness of the weighted network decreases during stress-
ful periods due to co-movements of the level and variance of the CDS spreads.
Hypothesis 2 During the crisis periods weaker links are formed and stronger
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links removed in the combined network of sovereigns and financial institutions.
The default probability of an entity characterized by a CDS spread varies
according to a shock hitting the network. This allows us to identify different
states of nature dependent on the source of the shocks. In good (or normal)
times, banks and sovereigns will achieve standard returns; in a poor outcome
period both produce lower than expected payoff. In this case, there are four
separate potential scenarios that the entity network may face when attempting
to meet its liabilities.
Good times: Investments by the financial sector achieve payoff and there
are no haircuts in sovereign debt markets. Financial institution networks should
function normally - all sources of income are available to meet liabilities.
Stress: There is a shock from the financial sector via poor performance in
private investments coinciding with a poor performance shock in the sovereign
debt market. A financial institution’s incoming counterparty payments needs
to exceed outside obligations owing due to the investment, the institution’s
own outgoing counterparty requirements, private investment losses, and reduced
value of the sovereign debt.
Poor investment: Financial institutions suffer a negative shock via invest-
ments which do not perform, however, sovereign debt markets perform normally.
Bond holdings and incoming counterparty payments need to exceed outside obli-
gations owed, the financial institution’s own counterparty requirements, and the
loss due to the poor investment outcome.
Poor government: Financial institution private investments perform well,
but there is a negative shock from the sovereign debt market. A financial institu-
tion’s income from successful investments and incoming counterparty payments
needs to exceed outside obligations due to the investment, the institution’s out-
going counterparty requirements, and the loss on sovereign bonds.
These scenarios identify conditions by which we can assess network robust-
ness and fragility. By subjecting our estimated network to shocks originating
from either sovereign debt or financial institutions we examine whether the
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combined network is highly interconnected, with a robust-yet-fragile structure,
as proposed by Haldane (2009). Such a network is at risk when exposed to
a large enough single shock, or sufficiently proximate contemporaneous small
shocks. A robust network will be relatively immune to even large shocks from
either source. A fragile network may have a large number of node failures (de-
faults) in response to even relatively smaller shocks. The scenarios illustrate
how combinations of events in private investment and sovereign debt markets
may place additional stress on existing banking networks. We establish that the
networks between sovereign debt and financial institutions change across our
sample period, and use the scenario analysis during different phases to assess
the robustness and fragility of the network in response to shocks.
There is likely to be less heterogeneity in sovereign debt market investment
opportunities available to the financial sector institutions than in private sector
investments. That is, although the failure of a relatively small private invest-
ment opportunity can cascade and cause financial stress (Acemoglu et al., 2015)
there are in practice fewer sovereign bond investment opportunities. Thus, a
shock in the sovereign debt market is likely to cause a simultaneous common
shock to a number of entities, providing a further means of amplifying a cri-
sis via the network. Both the stochastic shock and its variance are important
quantities that impact both sovereign and bank returns and may cause cascades
of defaults in the network.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
Modeling the interconnections between financial institutions is hampered by
data availability. On the one hand, many of the theoretical frameworks are
expressed in terms of inter-entity flows, such as Cabellero (2015). However, these
data are exceedingly difficult to obtain, particularly outside the official family;
a good example is the UK interbank network in Giraitis et al. (2016), who use
data available to the Bank of England. On the other hand, there is a strand of
literature that takes advantage of market-based data as proxies to develop an
11
understanding of the interconnectedness of networks, as in, for example, Merton
et al. (2013). Van de Leur and Lucas (2017) finds that the interconnectedness
networks based on market data produce valuable information that is not offered
by alternative approaches. The work in this paper draws on the market-based
data tradition in this literature.
Five-year CDSs are the most commonly issued and traded asset in this class
and are the most liquid (Bouri et al. 2017; Duca and Peltonen 2013; Kalbaska
and Gatkowsi 2012; Pan and Singleton 2008); data on these contracts were
extracted from Markit over the period from January 1, 2003, to November 21,
2013.2 Over the full period, there are 2842 end-of-day CDS spread prices for
each sovereign and institution. The combined dataset contains 40 individual
sovereigns and 67 institutions, for a total of 107 nodes used in the analysis, as
listed in Tables 1 and 2.
The sample is divided into three separate phases; Phase 1 represents the
non-crisis period from January 1, 2003, to September 14, 2008. This is typical
of dating conventions used to separate the pre-crisis and crisis periods; see the
review of dates extant in the literature in Dungey et al. (2015). Phase 2
represents the period from September 15, 2008, to March 31, 2010, consistent
with the global financial crisis (GFC) and period following. The end of March
2010 represents the period prior to which the Greek debt crisis became critical
in April 2010. Phase 3, from April 1, 2010, to November 21, 2013, represents
the post-GFC period which includes the Greek and European sovereign debt
crises.
The first panel of Table 3 shows summary statistics for Phase 1. Phase 1
is the longest of the three exogenously chosen time periods, containing 1488
observations per entity. Latin America displays a higher mean spread during
Phase 1, while financial institutions and insurance companies exhibit relatively
higher kurtosis than other groups.
2Unfortunately suitable updates to the database are not available because much of the
activity in this market has moved to other assets than the USD denominated issues selected
for this study, which seems to reflect changes in supervisory arrangements favoring domestic
currency issuance.
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The GFC period, Phase 2, is the shortest of the sub-sample phases, with 403
observations per entity. There is an increase in spread means for most groups of
institutions and sovereigns, reflecting the perceived increase in risk during this
turbulent period in international debt markets. The financial institution group
has the largest mean, standard deviation and kurtosis during Phase 2.
The third phase, associated with the post-GFC period including the Greek
debt crisis and subsequent European debt crisis, involves a small decline in
spread means; however the Eurozone group’s mean spreads increase from Phase
2, potentially due to the transformation of the Greek debt crisis into the Euro-
pean debt crises during the third phase. Insurance companies and Latin Amer-
ican sovereigns exhibit high levels of kurtosis compared with other groups.
The CDS spreads were found to be non-stationary, I(1), with a maximum
of one unit root according to KPSS and ADF tests. Moreover, the presence of
heteroskedasticity in daily spreads was confirmed by applying Breusch-Pagan
and White tests.
To control for exogenous common factors3 we use a combination of the global
indexes: the West Texas Intermediate US dollar based international index for
crude oil prices, the VIX index regarded as a standard measure of investors’ risk
aversion, and the MSCI world index capturing performance of the global stock
market.
4 Econometric Framework
4.1 Estimating the approximating network model
To take into consideration the common stochastic trend(s) between the I(1)
CDS series and the potential impact of exogenous global factors, a Vector Error
Correction Model (VECM) is specified as follows:
∆Yt = Exot + Π0Yt−1 +
k−1∑
j=1
Γj∆Yt−j + εt, (1)
3An importance of taking into account exogenous global factors has been also emphasized
by Alter and Beyer (2014).
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where Yt = [Y1,t,..., Yn,t]′, ∆Yt−j = Yt−j − Yt−j−1, Exot is a set of exogenous
variables in first differences, and Π0,Γ are the parameters of the model.4 The
VECM model defined in (1) needs to be estimable in high dimension, n = 107,
and for this reason we follow Demirer et al (2018) using LASSO techniques.5
While Demirer et al. (2018) applied the LASSO method to stationary I(0) data
to estimate a VAR the present paper deals with I(1) variables requiring a VECM
estimation. We follow Liao and Phillips (2015), and adopt the automated esti-
mation of the VECM defined in (1) which enables simultaneous estimation of
the cointegrating matrix Π0 and the transient parameters Γj . Specifically, the
LASSO-type estimator of Π0 and Γ0 = [Γ1, ...,Γk−1] is defined as
(Πˆ0, Γˆ0) = argmin
Π0,Γ1,...,Γk−1
{∑T
t=1 ‖∆Yt − Exot −Π0Yt−1 −
∑k−1
j=1 Γj∆Yt−j‖2
+ Tλ
∑k−1
j=1 ‖Γj‖+ Tλ‖Π0‖
}
,
(2)
where λ is a tuning parameter that directly control the penalization, ‖·‖ denotes
the Euclidean norm.6
Given the tuning parameter λ the shrinkage estimator (Πˆ0, Γˆ0) delivers a
one step estimator of (1). Parameter λ is chosen using cross validation with a
lambda-min criterion. A preparatory estimation of the rank of the matrix Π0 by
applying a Johansen test is not required in this case. The parameters of model
(1) are used to establish a structure of the network.
4.2 Establishing network edges via Granger causality
Financial institutions and sovereign debt issuers form network nodes linked by
edges. The use of Granger causality tests on CDS spreads to establish edges
4A constant term is suppressed for simplicity.
5LASSO blends shrinkage and selection and proves particularly appealing for large VARs
and VECMs. A detailed review of these techniques can be found in Hastie, Tibshirani, and
Wainwright (2015).
6The LASSO estimator presented in (2) is a simplified version of the LASSO proposed
by Liao and Phillips (2015) which works on the rows of the adaptively transformed matrix
defined by Π0. Here we penalize Π0 directly to reduce the number of tunning parameters.
14
between nodes has a number of advantages in this framework. It is directly
comparable to existing empirical networks of Billio et al. (2012) and Merton
et al. (2013). It establishes directional edges, allowing for an examination
of the causation from sovereign debt to banking markets. Granger causality
established edges map clearly to the existing empirical frameworks for measuring
and testing contagion during financial crises via the formation and breaking of
linkages (Dungey et al., 2005).
CDS spread data used to motivate the Granger causality testing effectively
represent a premium for insurance against the default of a third party. CDS
spread prices reflect a perceived risk of default; favorable news decreases the
value of the CDS spread, while unfavorable news increases the value. Signifi-
cant Granger causality from entity i to entity s indicates that Yi has at least
one significant lag predicting the value of Ys. Thus, perceived risk of entity i
defaulting predicts the perceived risk of default of entity s. The edges of the
network constructed from these Granger causality links represent predictors of
each node’s perceived risk of default.
Once a VECM in (1) is estimated7, it can be represented as a VAR
Yt = Exot +
k∑
j=1
ΦjYt−j + εt, (3)
with cross-equation restrictions Φ1 = Π0+Γ1+In, Φj = Γj−Γj−1, j = 2, 3, ..., k,
and where In is a unit matrix. Granger causality between CDS spreads Yi and
Ys can be assessed using the Wald test
WT = [e · vec(Φ̂)]′ [e(V̂ ⊗ (Y ′Y )−1)e′ ]−1[e · vec(Φ̂)], (4)
in which Y is the matrix of independent variables from (3), vec(Φ̂) denotes the
row vectorized coefficients of Φ̂ = [Φ1, ...,Φk], V̂ = T−1
∑T
t=1 εˆtεˆ
′
t and e is the
7The VECM is estimated using two lags. This represents a trade off between optimal lag
length criteria and degrees of freedom considerations. A robustness test of the optimal number
of lags is discussed in Section 5.3, but the results are largely unaffected by these changes.
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k × 2(2k + 1) selection matrix
e =

0 1 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0 0
 .
Each row of e selects one of the coefficients to set to zero under the non-causal
hypothesis Yi → Ys.
The empirical contagion literature typically focuses on changes in the struc-
ture of short-term relationships across two periods. Consider, for example, the
first-period interaction matrix estimated for a non-crisis period, denoted Φnc1 ,
and a crisis period, denoted Φcr1 , as follows:
Φnc1 =
[
φncii,1 φ
nc
is,1
φncsi,1 φ
nc
ss,1
]
,
Φcr1 =
[
φcrii,1 φ
cr
is,1
φcrsi,1 φ
cr
ss,1
]
.
Tests for changes in the network finance literature (and related tests for conta-
gion) can be characterized as tests of whether φncis,k = φ
cr
is,k and φ
nc
si,k = φ
cr
si,k for
all k.
In this paper, the focus is on the formation of new links:
new link from Yi to Ys H0 : φ
j−1
si,k = 0;φ
j
si,k 6= 0 (5)
new link from Ys to Yi H0 : φ
j−1
is,k = 0;φ
j
is,k 6= 0 (6)
and the breaking of existing links
broken link from Yi to Ys H0 : φ
j−1
si,k 6= 0;φjsi,k = 0 (7)
broken link from Ys to Yi H0 : φ
j−1
is,k 6= 0;φjis,k = 0 (8)
where index j is assigned to each of the three Phases.
The results of the Wald test indicating Granger causality are recorded as
binary entries in matrix A as
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A = [ais],
where ais = 0, if Yi does not Granger cause Ys; and ais = 1 otherwise. Matrix
A is used to construct the directional edges between sovereigns and banks.
4.3 Network connectedness
Once linkages between financial institutions and sovereigns, represented by ma-
trix A are established, the strength of these linkages can be quantified by assign-
ing weights W = [wij ] to network edges.8 Using the VAR from equation (3) as
an approximating model, weights wij can be obtained from variance decomposi-
tions, as proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). Suppose that j’s contribution
to entity i’s H-step-ahead orthogonalized forecast error variance, θoij(H), is
θoij(H) =
∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iBhPej)
2∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iBhV B
′
hei)
, H = 1, 2, 3, ...,
in which V is the variance-covariance matrix for the error vector εt, P is the
lower triangular matrix obtained from the Cholesky decomposition of PP
′
= V ,
and ei is the selection vector with one as the ith element and zero otherwise. The
coefficient matrices, Bi, obey the recursion Bi = Φ1Bi−1+Φ2Bi−2+...+ΦkBi−k,
with B0 being an n × n identity matrix and Bi = 0 for i < 0. Note that the
orthogonalized variance decomposition allows for correlated shocks and does
depend on the ordering of the variables.9
In the original framework of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) and Pe-
saran and Shin (1998), variance shares do not necessarily sum to 1, that is,∑n
j=1 θ
o
ij(H) 6= 1. Hence, each entry of the generalized variance decomposition
matrix is normalized by the row sum as
wij =
θoij(H)∑n
j=1 θ
o
ij(H)
.
8In this case, the network is defined as a weighted directed graph. A weighted financial
network is also used by Demirer et al. (2018) and Glasserman and Young (2015) to model
connectedness between financial institutions.
9The variance decomposition estimates are not sensitive to different orderings as discussed
in Section 5.3.
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Now, by construction,
∑n
j=1 wij = 1 and
∑n
i,j=1 wij = n.
Given the estimates of matrix A and weighting matrix10 W = [wij ], the
structure of the weighted network can be characterized by matrix
A˜ = AW,
where  is the Hadamard product. Elements of adjacency matrix A˜ capture
the connectedness between institutions and sovereigns conditional on significant
casual linkages between them.11 The network defined by adjacency matrix A˜
shows the predictors of the risk of default subject to a shock captured by matrix
W . Using the entries of matrix A˜, system-wide completeness is measured as
C =
∑n
i,j=1
i6=j
a˜ij∑n
i,j=1
i6=j
wij
. (9)
This measure is used in the following sections to analyze the system-wide con-
nectedness between the financial institutions and sovereigns.12
5 Results
To illustrate the degree of connectivity in the financial network, Figure 1 repre-
sents the network of weighted significant Granger causality links between pairs
of financial institutions in Phase 1 at the 5% significance level.13 This net-
work is characterized by a node size, node color, edge thickness and edge ar-
row size.14 The node size and the node color indicate the weighted degree
of a node (the number of edges that are incident on that node), ranging from
10Matrix W is not necessarily symmetric, in contrast to the partial correlation network of
Anufriev and Panchenko (2015), which is symmetric by construction.
11This approach extends the spillover index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). While the
spillover index contains all elements of a variance decomposition matrix, here, the elements
that are not linked causally are equal to zero. The importance of disentangling the network
strength from the network structure is also highlighted by Scida (2015) in a different context.
12The completeness measure can be computed for sub-networks (e.g., the completeness of
a specific geographical region) in the same way by summing up the specific elements a˜ij and
wij .
13The results are almost unaffected by more stringent significance levels such as 1%.
14The same graphical display is used for all empirical results. The open-source software
GEPHI is used to visualize network graphs.
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bright (low weighted degree) to dark orange (high weighted degree). Edge thick-
ness and edge arrow sizes indicate pairwise directional connectedness "TO" and
"FROM". Following Demirer et al. (2018) we determine node location using
the ForceAtlas2 algorithm. This algorithm finds a state in which edges attract
the nodes they connect according to average pairwise connectedness, highlight-
ing the entities that are more important in terms of weighted degrees. The
financial network, presented in Figure 1, is highly, connected consistent with
results in Longstaff et al. (2011), Eichengreen et al. (2012), and Eom and
Park (2017). Furthermore, three major insurance companies, AEG, ACE and
AIG, are the main spreaders of systemic risk, see also Dungey et al. (2018) for
evidence on the importance of US insurers. Due to the difficulty of analyzing
highly interconnected nodes visually, we do not present the combined network
of financial institutions and sovereigns. In both cases, the degree of connectivity
is relatively high - the potential number of links is 67!/65!(=4355) links in the
financial instiutions network, and 107!/105!(=11342) in the combined network.
5.1 Financial Institutions network
To aid analytical tractability, we condense the network shown in Figure 1 to five
nodes. The 67 financial institutions in our sample are grouped into institutional
types: banks, insurance companies, investment banks, real estate firms, and
other financial institutions. The constituents of these groups are shown in Table
1. The dispersion of these institutions by country is not conducive to undertaking
a geographic-institutional breakdown; as we are considering institutions involved
in the CDS market we make the relatively safe assumption these institutions are
globally active investors.15 Institutions may invest in almost any sovereign debt
market and be involved in cross-border counterparty arrangements and have
sophisticated currency hedging mechanisms in place. A potential limitation of
our approach is home bias or incomplete currency hedging distorting the results.
15An analysis of the changing connections between financial institutions in Europe and the
US using equity market data may be found in Diebold and Yilmaz (2016), and for global banks
in Demirer et al. (2018). Moreover, a number of papers consider the detailed relationships
for CDS within these regions. For example, see Fabozzi et al. (2016) for the Eurozone.
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Figure 2 presents the same information as Figure 1 using the institutional
types as nodes, displaying the same high degree of completeness. The width and
shade of the edges indicate the strength of links between two nodes, representing
the proportion of significant linkages among potential linkages, as explained in
Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Figure 2 illustrates the strength of the links involving
banks, financial institutions, and insurance companies, while links to real estate
and investment firms are less strong. Arrows on the ends of edges provide
evidence on direction of transmission - the results suggest bidirectional linkages.
A node size represents importance of an industry in terms of weighted degree.
Formally, Hypothesis 1 is tested by estimating a Jaccard coefficient (JC) that
measures similarity between networks in two different phases. This coefficient
takes values between 0 and 1 and is normally distributed. If JC < 0.5 the
completeness of the network is different in two phases. Table 4 shows that the
the estimated values of JC are all significant and less than 0.5, indicating that
the network in Phase 1 is statistically different from that in Phase 2, and the
network in Phase 2 is statistically different from that in Phase 3.
Table 5 documents that 1040 of the 4355 potential links exist in Phase 1,
increasing to 1323 in Phase 2, confirming a change in the network topology.
Between Phase 1 and Phase 2, the net increase in links is due to the formation
of 1024 links, overwhelming the loss of 741 stronger links (the average strength
of the new links is 0.0164 compared with that of the removed links of 0.0196).
Thus, between Phases 1 and 2, the completeness of the weighted network of
financial institutions drops from 41.25% to 38.33%, primarily through reduced
strength of links. Eichengreen et al. (2012), also find that spillovers from US to
European banks decrease during the GFC period.
The further removal of 1146 (weaker) links and formation of 386 (stronger)
links between Phase 2 and Phase 3 means that the net loss of 760 links results in
weighted network completeness falling to 20.00%, primarily due to a decreased
number of links. Overall the Phase 3 network has 477 fewer links than Phase 1,
and the average strength of links has decreased. This finding points to potential
increased fragility of the financial sector during the GFC, consistent with Alter
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and Schuler (2012). Once both the existence and strength of linkages are taken
into account, the completeness of the financial network is lower in Phase 2
compared with Phase 1 - which differs from the findings of Diebold and Yilmaz
(2016) - and lower still in Phase 3, consistent with Caporin et al. (2018).
Figure 3 illustrates the location and strength of newly formed and removed
linkages for each phase. The reduction in links is distributed relatively evenly
across banks, financial institutions, and insurance companies in Phase 1 and
Phase 2 (Figure 3a). The removal of links between banks and insurance compa-
nies is also indirectly observable through a financial channel by unraveling the
strong direct connections from banks to financial institutions and from the latter
to insurance. This pattern is part of the complex debate surrounding whether
insurers were causal in generating the systemic risk of this period (Biggs and
Richardson, 2014). An investment channel stayed relatively unchanged between
Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Between Phase 2 and Phase 3, there is evidence of strong disconnection be-
tween banks and all other entities. Banks and financial institutions are the
focus of a substantial number of disconnections during the crisis, and this may
reflect new international risk assessments and domestic regulatory environments
whereby financial companies are recognized as contributing to systemic risk.
However, the removed links from financial companies to insurers highlight the
further propagation of systemic risks. Insurers favor self-regulation and insur-
ance as a recipient of shocks from banks, an argument supported in Cummins
and Weiss (2014), but in contrast with the view of the Financial Stability Board,
and Acharya et al. (2014b), who report that insurers may propagate systemic
risk. Real Estate and investment companies are even more disconnected from
Banks and Insurance.
As a proportion of total links, there are relatively few new links forming
during Phase 2, shown in Figure 3c. As institutions attempt to manage their
portfolios, and risk appetite generally decreases, the financial system becomes
less interconnected. Regulators around the globe have more carefully monitored
financial institutions since 2008, and formed new bodies to address segments of
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the financial sector, which may have been a contributing factor.
5.2 Combined financial institutions and sovereign debt
network
The combined financial institutions and sovereign network has potentially 107!105!
(=11342) links. The number of links in Phase 1 is 1734, increasing to 3737 in
Phase 2 and falling to 1297 in Phase 3, as reported in Table 5. As before, the
Jaccard statistics reported in Table 4 show that the networks are statistically
significantly different between Phases 1, 2 and 3.
The intertwining of these two sectors is relatively incomplete in the pre-crisis
period (at 28.28%) but rises substantially during the GFC sample. The results
also reflect the increases in linkages found by Merton et al. (2013) and Betza
et al. (2016). Network link changes seem relatively large but must be seen in
the context of total number of links; in total 584 (5.15% of all possible links)
were unchanged in the unweighted network during the sample period and 6455
(56.91%) links did not exist at any point in the sample. However, between Phase
1 and Phase 2, the network lost 1150 and gained 3153 links, a net gain of 2003.
Hypothesis 2 tests for a change in the average strength of the links formed
and lost between Phases using a standard two-sample t-test. The hypothesis of
equal strength of formed and removed links between Phases 2 and 3 is rejected at
the 5% level. The average strength of the formed links in the weighted network
was 0.0088, weaker than that of the lost links of 0.0125. That is, the increased
completeness between Phases 1 and 2 is due to the formation of more weaker
links in the presence of declining strong links. In the transition from Phase 2
to Phase 3, a further 3303 links, of average strength 0.0092, were lost and 863
formed, of average strength 0.0123. The net loss of 2440 links were of lower
average strength than those gained, such that overall the number of links fell,
contributing to the decline in weighted network completeness.
Not only do the proportions of links change between phases but the taxon-
omy of these changes is highly revealing. Categorizing nodes into geographic
sovereign debt markets and financial institution types, as in the previous sub-
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section, Figure 4 provides the schematic for links that are broken and formed
from Phases 1 to 2, and from Phases 2 to 3.
The results in Figure 4a show that the CDS premia for insurance companies
became disconnected from bank CDS premia during the first crisis phase. There
is a concentration of lost connections between the banks and Euro, Europe, Latin
America, Asia, and Africa sovereign sector links. The Eurozone’s disconnection
from Europe and Asia is not evident in the link changes.
Relatively more links are formed between Phase 1 and Phase 2, as shown in
Figure 4c. Most pronounced are the new links between banks and Asian and
Latin American sovereign bond markets, suggesting an increasing importance
of developing markets in global risk determination during this phase. There are
also some increases in bank linkages with North American sovereign markets.
During Phase 3, the links previously established between banks and Euro-
pean, Asian and Latin American sovereigns are largely undone, as shown in
Figure 4b. There is less evidence of a retraction of links with financial sec-
tor nodes, although the reduction of linkages with financial firms is relatively
strong. This is consistent with the findings in Buch et al. (2016) showing re-
duced links between German banks and sovereign bonds during the European
debt crisis. Newly formed links in this phase, as shown in Figure 4d, relate to
banks and insurance companies. Further influences on new connections may in-
clude asset write-downs, increased premia, regulator scrutiny of sovereign debt
exposure, and feedback effects between sovereign debt markets and banks (and,
by extension, the financial sector).
The combined network is characterized by highest completeness during crisis
Phase 2, originating from banks and financial companies. Moreover, the net
number of new links is positive for Phase 2 and negative for Phase 3, consistent
with results reported by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) for the global equity market,
and banking-sovereign debt CDS relationships in Betza et al. (2016); both
show that system-wide connectedness is higher during the GFC. The difference
between our work and existing network papers based on Granger causality is
the use of weighted networks, revealing that although the number of unweighted
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links may increase during a crisis, when the links are weighted by their relative
strength, the completeness of the network may not decline by as much as in an
unweighted system (and in some cases, the weights may be sufficient to induce
an increase in network completeness).16
5.3 Specification robustness checks
We report a number of specification variations and perform a number of robust-
ness checks for our preferred specification.
The lag length choice for the estimated VAR is based on using an AIC and
SIC criteria for the model but restricting the choice to the same lag length for
each variable. The SIC criterion favors a VAR(1). The AIC criteria favors
a VAR(3). We choose to implement at VAR(2) in the body of the paper as
a compromise which both retains a higher degree of dynamics and trades off
the loss of degrees of freedom with longer lags. Implementation of a VAR(3)
as supported by AIC criteria makes little qualitative difference to the results.
Chan-Lau (2017) also finds little sensitivity in network estimation to changing
lag length. A VAR(2) of this dimension has 214 AR parameters to estimate in
each equation, putting considerable strain on the data. However, the Cholesky
decomposition does allow us to use the residuals from the most exogenous vari-
ables as instruments for those of increasing endogeneity - that is the VAR could
be estimated on an equation by equation basis equivalently. The smallest sam-
ple size is in Phase 2, with 403 observations. This does not leave a great number
of degrees of freedom, but adequate in this instance for consistent if not efficient
estimates. Given that we are not concerned with the efficiency of the individual
parameter estimates in the VAR (we use LASSO to improve the efficiency of
the system) this problem is less pressing. It does, however, provide a further
16Recent work by Pesaran and Yang (2016) shows how a network can be characterized by
δi, the estimated degree of pervasiveness, based on the weighted column sums of the adjacency
matrix (normalized by row). The most dominant node in the network has the largest value
of δi, subject to the caveat that δi > 0.5 for the existence of a valid network effect. The
application of this framework to our network provides evidence of weakly dominant banking
and insurance sectors in the first phase and weakly dominant banking in the following two
phases. None of the sovereign nodes become dominant in any phase. Consequently, the results
of this approach are aligned with the results presented in the paper.
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rationale for favoring a VAR(2) specification over a higher order lag.
5.3.1 Random ordering
The weights of the networks discussed in the previous section are obtained from
the variance decompositions, which are sensitive to the ordering of variables in
a VAR. Chan-Lau (2017) provides evidence of this effect in financial networks
and suggests alternatives. To check if our empirical results are sensitive to dif-
ferent orderings we reproduce the results presented in Table 5 using the random
variable sequences of Klossner and Wagner (2014). This procedure permits cal-
culation of the spillover index’s maximum, minimum and standard deviation
over different orderings.
Table 6 presents the results of random ordering exercise for the combined
network. Comparing Tables 5 and 6 shows that the estimated average strength
of links is not sensitive to various ordering. All estimates lie in the range (differ-
ence between minimum and maximum) and standard deviations in Phases 1-3
are more than 5 times smaller than the values of average strength. Complete-
ness (the bottom panel of Table 6) is also estimated within the range with the
smallest standard deviation in Phase 2.
5.3.2 Omitted common exogenous factors
Panel A of Table 7 gives the results for when the network is estimated without
the inclusion of the exogenous common controls, Exot in equation (3). While
the average strength of the links is only marginally changed the model with
no common exogenous variables has an increased number of edges and conse-
quently an increased weighted completeness. The most evident difference is in
the number of edges and the strength of these edges during the GFC (Phase 2)
- without taking into account the exogenous variables these statistics estimates
4345 edges compared with 3737 edges with controls and the average strength is
0.0104 compared to 0.0093. Incorporating the exogenous factors into the model
reduces the number of links established between Phase 1 and 2 to 3153 compared
with 3599 links when we ignore changes in the external economic environment.
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The results support arguments made in the literature that ignoring common
factors will lead to an over-estimation of the degree of interconnectedness in a
network.
5.3.3 GARCH filtered returns
A number of existing papers pre-filter data for GARCH(1, 1) prior to net-
work estimation, including Billio et al. (2012), and Merton et al. (2013).
The rationale behind this approach is that the volatility changes may result
in over-identification of spillovers in levels. Our approach has been to retain
the volatility as an important part of understanding the changing transmission
process. We construct our estimates for the network using data prefiltered for
GARCH(1, 1) and report the results for the numbers of links, average strength
of links and completeness statistics as before. The changes are not dramatic,
and the qualitative story is unchanged. Panel B of Table 7 shows that weighted
completeness increases marginally in Phase 1, the least volatile period, due to
an increased number of identified links - the weight of the links is virtually
unchanged between the filtered and unfiltered network. The number of links
which are removed in the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 is larger, meaning
that the drop in completeness is larger in the filtered model. The difference
between the Phase 2 weighted completeness results is less than 0.01 using the
filtered and unfiltered data. Essentially, there is no evidence that the filtering
has any substantial effect on the results presented in the main body of the text
(although in Billio et al., 2012, it eases the estimation problem).
5.3.4 Other weight structures
The choice of data to estimate weight structures will influence the outcome
of the network linkages. When the weight structures change significantly the
analytical results will be affected. Rather than iterating through many possible
alternatives, some of which may be substitutes and some complements to the risk
premia revealed by CDS market linkages, the next steps in this agenda will be
to construct multi-layer networks which allow for connections through different
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types of links. Research in this direction has recently emerged in Aldosoro and
Alves (2017) who breakdown their network based on the asset class and long,
medium or short term liabilities, and in Magkonis and Tsopanakis (2018) who
combine the cross-country and inter-country linkages between equity, bond, and
money markets for a subset of Eurozone countries.
6 Robustness and Fragility: How the network re-
acts to shocks
We now consider the evidence for whether the network is robust-but-fragile, and
how this might change during different phases of the sample we have examined.
Thus far we have found that the network changes over time both in the number
and strength of the links, providing evidence of contagion between phases, see
also Betza et al. (2016). On top of this we now show that when the networks
are faced with varying strengths and sources of shock they experience different
rates of CDS default during the different phases.
We subject the networks in each phase to a range of shocks. The expected
number of defaults can be estimated from significant Granger causality linkages
and the respective variance decompositions, as discussed in Section 4. We as-
sume that a higher number of expected CDS defaults in a network indicates
a higher degree of fragility (Zhou, 2016). For any given network structure the
estimated expected number of defaults is characterized by an external shock
obtained as a standard deviation of an equally weighted portfolio of log-returns
estimated from the exogenous variables discussed in Section 4, generated rel-
ative to the shock Vij , and by the probability of a default for sovereign and
financial sectors.
To estimate the probability of a default the predicted values of the CDS
spreads from the estimates from equation (3) are used to generate one-step ahead
forecasts. An expanding window forecasting is used to obtain the predicted
sample of the CDS spreads in each of the phases. We count the number of days
when a predicted spread is higher/lower than average CDS spreads. Formally,
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in each phase, the probability of a default for sector K =(Sovereigns, Financial
Institutions)=(S, F ) is given by
Prdefault(K) =
predicted number of increased CDS spreads
number of days in a phase
and
Prno default(K) =
predicted number of non-increased spreads
number of days in a phase
.
These default probabilities are then combined together with the effect of the
external shocks in each sector to obtain an aggregated shock, uj,m, j = 1, ..., 107,
m = 1, ..., 4 that affects each node j (which is either a sovereign or a financial
institution) subject to scenario m:
Good times: uj,1 = Prno default(S) · uj,1(S) + Prno default(F ) · uj,1(F ),
Stress : uj,2 = Prdefault(S) · uj,2(S) + Prdefault(F ) · uj,2(F ),
Poor investment: uj,3 = Prno default(S) · uj,3(S) + Prdefault(F ) · uj,3(F ),
Poor government: uj,4 = Prdefault(S) · uj,4(S) + Prno default(F ) · uj,4(F ),
where uj,m(K) is an external shock obtained from Vij and the exogenous vari-
ables. These aggregated shocks are used to obtain variance decompositions for
each entity. The total expected number of defaults for the entire network is given
as the average of the variance decomposition elements related to the sovereign
and financial institution nodes.
Figure 5 has three panels, representing how the network responds to shocks
in the three different phases. Increases across the horizontal axis refer to higher
volatility shocks, and indicate that even within the same network structure the
expected rate of CDS default increases with higher volatility. That is, even
interdependence may cause problems for financial networks during times of fi-
nancial stress, stemming from mechanisms such as the flight to familiarity effect
identified in Giannetti and Laeven (2012, 2015). These results confirm that
each these highly interconnected networks display a structure with increasing
fragility as volatility rises.
When the network structures change between the Phases, the diagrams also
show changes in the default rates when faced with shocks, consistent with a
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changing degree of fragility in the network. Consider Phase 1. In this case
the good times scenario where no shocks are applied, leads to an expected 2
defaults as volatility rises, even with high volatility of 3 standard deviation
shocks. The case with shocks to the sovereigns (poor government) increases
default probability only slightly. However, shocks through the financial sector
(poor investment) promote more fragility. Up to 15 defaults may be observed in
the financial sector in response to 3 standard deviation financial sector shocks.
In combination, where both sovereign and financial sector shocks occur (crisis
times) the increase is only slightly above that of poor investment. Here the
main source of fragility is clearly in the financial sector.
Phase 2, the crisis period, provides a different picture. Even in the no shock
scenario (good times) the network is fragile in response to high volatility. With
high volatility over 60 of the 107 nodes are expected to default. With the
addition of sovereign and financial sector induced shocks, this rises to over 100,
or almost all the nodes. (This means that mechanisms which transfer shocks
in one sector to the other must be in place, as the expected number of defaults
exceeds the number of nodes in either sector.)
In response to shocks and periods of increased volatility the network is highly
fragile in Phase 2. It is evident that the main source of the volatility in this
phase is via the sovereign debt market. This likely reflects the many programs
put in place to support the banking sector during this phase, which resulted in
risk transfer from the banking sector in Phase 1 to the sovereign sector in Phase
2.
In Phase 3 the results support a robust network. The expected number of
defaults reduces considerably. The probability of default when not subject to
shocks but facing rising volatility (good times) is similar to Phase 1. How-
ever, the overall expected number of defaults when faced with shocks from both
sectors (stress) is vastly reduced over Phase 1, with fewer than 4 defaults ex-
pected even under high volatility conditions. Further, the expected defaults
from shocks sourced in either sovereign or financial sector separately now have
similar effects in producing defaults.
29
These scenarios present a convincing anatomy of the crisis and serve to
confirm that not only is a robust-but-fragile structure supported in the data,
but that the fragility of the network changes across different phases. In the
build up to the GFC the network was robust to increasing volatility, as long
as there were not shocks to the increasingly fragile banking sector. The shift
in network structure during the GFC crisis period presented a highly fragile
network. During this period shocks to financial or sovereign sector nodes affected
more than their own sector, with evidence that fragility had been effectively
transferred to the sovereign sector. In the post-GFC phase the network returned
to a more robust structure, despite the problems of the Greek and European
debt crisis contained within the Phase, with more balance between the risk of
default posed by either financial sector or sovereign sector shocks.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates international connections between financial institutions
and sovereign debt markets. The results reinforce the ‘robust-but-fragile’ nature
of networks of financial institutions and sovereign debt markets where shocks
from the credit provision decisions of either or both of these sources provide
a means of amplifying uncertainty via the network. We analyze a panel of
107 financial institution and sovereign CDS spreads for the period 2003-2014.
Within this period we identify three Phases which broadly correspond to the pre-
GFC, GFC and a post-GFC period which incorporates the Greek and European
debt crises.
The results of this work suggest that it is the intertwining of these mar-
kets that can result in financial fragility. In Phase 1 we observed a financial
sector presenting important source of risk to the network robustness. While in
Phase 2 the network is simply fragile to shocks sourced from either sector, the
sovereign sector is a more important impetus for default. Finally Phase 3 shows
the re-establishment of a more robust network, and one where the default risk
from shocks in either sector is more equally aligned. The results support the
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importance of adopting a combined approach to systemic risk, monitoring both
financial institution and sovereign debt. Transfer of risk from one sector to an-
other, particularly during periods of stress, warrants vigilance in understanding
which sector is the more vulnerable as the network changes over time.
The empirical work in this paper provides evidence of the changing strength
of linkages between nodes in the network of financial institutions and sovereigns
during periods of stress. The number of links between nodes changes between
Phases 1 and 2, increasing the density of the unweighted combined network
consistent with the existing literature. However, with a weighted network we
find that weighted completeness can decrease during periods of stress due to
the changing nature of the links. We demonstrate the effect of the case where
the net number of connections increases, but with a reduction in the average
strength of those connections. The number of stronger connections may reduce
and more weaker connections emerge across Phases. The changing completeness
of the combined network in the different phases and under different scenarios
represents changes in the structure and combination of what Acemoglu et al.
(2015) classify as a γ-convex combination of networks. Overall, less diversified
patterns of linkages are more fragile during crisis times but could be more robust
when normal times prevail.
Network analysis can considerably enrich our understanding of fragility in
the financial sector. However, the tool requires a clear understanding of the
components of the network, and how they change over time. On the one hand
the unweighted network shows an increase in interconnectedness over time -
which under BIS criteria is indicative of more risk. On the other hand, the
replacement of lost strong links with a larger number of weaker links is evidence
that there are substitution possibilities in the network, pointing to a mechanism
which aids in managing systemic risk. The results are clear that during Phase
2, the GFC period, the network is more fragile than in the pre and post-GFC
periods. The source of network fragility in the pre-GFC period is the financial
sector, and the crisis results in feedbacks between banking and sovereign nodes
consistent with the diabolic loop, while post-crisis the risks from sovereign and
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financial institution sourced shocks are more similar and the network is more
robust.
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Table 1: Financial institutions grouped by broad type.
Banks Financials Insurance
Aust & New Zld Bkg ACOM CO LTD ACE Ltd
Amern Express Co John Deere Cap Corp Aegon N.V.
Barclays Bk plc MBIA Inc. American Intl Gp Inc
BNP Paribas Natl Rural Utils Coop Allstate Corp
Cap One Finl Corp Aiful Corp Aon Corp
Citigroup Inc ORIX Corp Assicurazioni Generali
Ctrywde Home Lns Gen Elec Cap Corp CHUBB CORP
Kookmin Bk Goldman Sachs Gp Inc CNA Finl Corp
Commerzbank AG Morgan Stanley Legal & Gen Gp PLC
Deutsche Bk AG SEARS ROEBUCK MBIA Ins Corp
Hana Bank Toyota Mtr Cr Corp MetLife Inc
HSBC Bk plc Swire Pac Ltd Munich Re
ING Bk N V Old Mut plc
Korea Dev Bk Safeco Corp
Merrill Lynch & Co Mitsui Sumitomo Ins
Mizuho Corporate Bk Sompo Japan Ins Inc
Macquarie Bk Ltd HARTFORD FIN INC
Natl Aust Bk Ltd Loews Corp
Oversea Chinese Bkg
Rabobank Nederland
Royal Bk of Scotland
Resona Bk Ltd
Societe Generale
Std Chartered Bk
Sumitomo Mitsui Bkg
UBS AG
Wells Fargo & Co
Westpac Bkg Corp
Investment Real Estate
Daiwa Secs Gp EOP Oper Ltd Pship
Bombardier Hammerson PLC
Nomura Secs Hongkong Ld Co
Mitsubishi Estate Co
Simon Ppty Gp L P
Simon Ppty Gp Inc
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Table 2: Sovereigns grouped by region. Groups are
intentionally broad to minimize the total number.
Europe Asia Latin America
Bulgaria Australia Argentina
Czech Republic China Brazil
Denmark Indonesia Chile
Norway Japan Colombia
Poland Malaysia Mexico
Sweden Philippines Panama
Russia South Korea Peru
Turkey Thailand Venezuela
Ukraine Vietnam
Africa Euro Zone North America
Israel Belgium USA
Morocco Finland
South Africa France
Qatar Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
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Table 3: Summary statistics are reported for sovereign and
financial institution CDS spread data used in this paper.
Obs. Mean Std dev Skewness Kurtosis
Phase 1 01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008
Banks 1488 0.4253 0.6634 6.2252 73.1315
Financials 1488 0.7426 1.4386 9.2843 131.738
Insurance 1488 0.5413 1.1174 10.551 146.240
Investment 1488 1.0126 1.6023 3.5076 19.9933
Real Estate 1488 0.5737 0.5135 2.5807 11.3350
Latin America 1488 3.3274 5.0302 4.3823 24.8403
Asia 1488 1.0935 1.3470 1.4863 4.1704
Euro Zone 1488 0.0698 0.0759 2.8669 11.6775
Europe 1488 0.9062 1.5211 2.8717 13.9841
Africa 1488 0.8038 0.7205 2.5980 11.9358
North America 1488 0.0262 0.0311 2.9249 11.0294
Phase 2 15/09/2008 - 31/03/2010
Banks 403 1.6490 1.2574 2.1977 8.4938
Financials 403 12.719 32.619 6.6554 58.383
Insurance 403 3.6890 5.1029 2.4613 9.2081
Investment 403 1.9650 1.1711 1.0721 2.8133
Real Estate 403 2.6080 2.4492 1.4525 4.1223
Latin America 403 6.3541 8.8135 2.2891 7.7371
Asia 403 2.0159 1.5864 1.7696 7.0876
Euro Zone 403 0.8250 0.5597 1.5966 6.8034
Europe 403 3.4588 6.4693 3.8884 20.298
Africa 403 1.9245 0.9750 1.3394 4.5551
North America 404 0.4169 0.1834 1.1935 3.9374
Phase 3 01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013
Banks 951 1.3971 0.6334 1.6584 6.8687
Financials 951 6.3933 10.211 2.0464 5.9045
Insurance 951 1.8314 2.1538 3.7857 20.033
Investment 951 1.4738 1.0772 0.5886 2.2274
Real Estate 951 1.1053 0.4586 0.6091 2.8172
Latin America 951 3.7769 5.6733 3.1106 14.840
Asia 951 1.3284 0.7275 1.6687 6.1909
Euro Zone 951 2.5872 2.5487 1.9267 7.1373
Europe 951 1.6592 1.9220 2.2460 7.9880
Africa 951 1.4990 0.5059 0.5376 2.5000
North America 951 0.3067 0.0801 -0.2616 2.3762
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Table 4: Jaccard similarity coefficients (JCij) are estimated for phases i and j. The values
significant at the 5% level are marked by (*). If JCij < 0.5 the hypothesis of equal
connectedness in two phases is rejected.
JC12 JC23
Financial network 0.2531∗ 0.1877∗
Combined network 0.2135∗ 0.1724∗
Table 5: This table contains statistics used in the analysis of network structures.
The average link strength is estimated from the connectedness of each respective network.
The number of edges was calculated using bivariate Granger causality tests
between network nodes (entities). Completeness is calculated via equation (9).
Formed Removed
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 2 2 to 3
Financial network
Average strength 0.0203 0.0171 0.0188 0.0164 0.0185 0.0196 0.0172
No. of edges 1040 1323 563 1024 386 741 1146
Completeness 0.4125 0.3833 0.2000 0.2852 0.1348 0.2843 0.3356
Combined network
Average strength 0.0137 0.0093 0.0124 0.0088 0.0123 0.0125 0.0092
No. of edges 1734 3737 1297 3153 863 1150 3303
Completeness 0.2828 0.3452 0.1764 0.2748 0.1161 0.1705 0.3018
Table 6: This table contains statistics used in the analysis of network structures.
The average link strength is estimated from the connectedness of each respective network.
The number of edges was calculated using bivariate Granger causality tests
between network nodes (entities). Completeness is calculated via equation (9). Minimum,
maximum and standard deviations of these statistics are obtained using random variable
sequences following Klossner and Wagner (2014).
Formed Removed
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 2 2 to 3
Combined network
Average strength 0.0137 0.0093 0.0124 0.0088 0.0123 0.0125 0.0092
Minimum 0.0125 0.0090 0.0103 0.0087 0.0106 0.0124 0.0091
Maximum 0.0168 0.0105 0.0184 0.0106 0.0178 0.0168 0.0105
Standard deviation 0.0018 0.0001 0.0016 0.0001 0.0017 0.0018 0.0001
Completeness 0.2828 0.3452 0.1764 0.2748 0.1161 0.1705 0.3018
Minimum 0.2656 0.3421 0.1516 0.2706 0.1027 0.1701 0.3004
Maximum 0.3557 0.4086 0.2722 0.3444 0.1707 0.2308 0.3585
Standard deviation 0.0370 0.0186 0.0231 0.0177 0.0163 0.0245 0.0171
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Table 7: Robustness results to networks estimated (A) without common exogenous
factors and (B) with GARCH(1,1) pre-filtering. This table contains statistics used in
the analysis of network structures. The average link strength is estimated from the
connectedness of each respective network. The number of edges was calculated using
Completeness is calculated via equation (9).
Formed Removed
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 2 2 to 3
A: Without exogenous factors
Average strength 0.0133 0.0104 0.0126 0.0100 0.0123 0.0106 0.0103
No. of edges 1889 4345 1552 3599 913 1143 3706
Completeness 0.3604 0.4579 0.2249 0.3642 0.1290 0.1746 0.3851
B: GARCH(1,1) prefiltering
Average strength 0.0131 0.0096 0.0103 0.0091 0.0103 0.0127 0.0097
No. of edges 1997 3567 1363 2882 904 1312 3108
Completeness 0.3359 0.3507 0.1572 0.2696 0.1043 0.2143 0.3094
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Figure 1: This figure displays the network of financial institutions in Phase 1
(01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008). Edges were calculated with Granger causality tests
between financial institutions (nodes) at the 5% level of significance.
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Figure 2: This figure shows a condensed version of the Phase 1 financial net-
work from Figure 1. The changes are performed by grouping financial institu-
tions/nodes into industries.
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(a): Removed links Phase 1 to 2 (b): Removed links Phase 2 to 3
(c): Formed links Phase 1 to 2 (d): Formed links Phase 2 to 3
Figure 3: This group of figures displays changes in the financial network between Phase 1
(01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008), Phase 2 (15/09/2008 - 31/03/2010) and Phase 3
(01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013). Changes are calculated using matrix A˜.
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(a): Removed links Phase 1 to 2 (b): Removed links Phase 2 to 3
(c): Formed links Phase 1 to 2 (d): Formed links Phase 2 to 3
Figure 4: This group of figures displays the combined sovereign and financial network changes.
Changes between Phase 1 (01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008), Phase 2 (15/09/2008 - 31/03/2010) and
Phase 3 (01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013) are calculated from matrix A˜.
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(a): Phase 1 (01/01/2003 - 14/09/2008)
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(b): Phase 2 (15/09/2008 - 31/03/2010)
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(c): Phase 3 (01/04/2010 - 21/10/2013)
Figure 5: This set of figures shows expected number of defaults in the combined network for a shock size by multiples
of standard deviations under the different scenarios. The logarithm of the CDS spreads is used for calculation.
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